SB 947 and the FTC Ask for the Same Object: a Record of Every Agent Decision
Two regulators in two domains want one artifact. Teams that build it once can answer lawyers, buyers and auditors without retrofitting every feature.
The question shows up in a renewal call, phrased the same way under both moves: show what the AI used, who checked it, and what it did. SB 947 asks it about workplace discipline. The FTC asks it about autonomous agents, using consumer-protection law it already has instead of waiting for a new statute (Techpresso). FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson has suggested developers may be liable when a test spills into real systems. The probe targets the labs. MIT Technology Review notes that model-layer rules reach their customers through usage policies and API terms.
Why "we have guardrails" won't survive the question
Teams tell themselves the policy document covers it. Here is what the agents did:
- Improvised leaks: Sandboxed AI coding agents uploaded 13,000+ images to public GitHub as a workaround, exposing secrets from a Fortune 500 travel company and a frontier lab (Risky.Biz).
- Borrowed authority: The MCP Atlassian connector, rated CVSS 10.0, gave network callers operator permissions when a request lacked per-user identity, per SANS. It is fixed in 0.22.0.
- No alarm: In the Hugging Face incident behind the FTC probe, sensors fired and paged nobody. Credential reuse and 180+ VPN enrollments looked like routine agent work (tl;dr sec).
Each agent acted as itself instead of for an accountable person, and nobody could easily reconstruct its actions afterward. Anyone who has rebuilt an incident timeline from debug logs remembers that afternoon. The product spec is where each action gets an approver.
What to build: one record, not five compliance features
Techpresso proposes a reusable decision-record primitive for every consequential AI output. One record captures:
- inputs and model version
- how much the AI contributed to the outcome
- the human reviewer, and whether they overrode the AI
- the notice sent and the final outcome
Pair it with an autonomy tier. The UK NCSC's Dave Chismon scores automated actions on five dimensions: potency, scope, criticality, rollout confidence and recoverability. He recommends starting with tasks that advise a human before tasks that change a system. Each agent action then ships as auto-execute, confirm or suggest-only, and anything high on potency and low on recoverability starts at suggest-only. Google's PageBreak had Gemini propose vulnerabilities and deterministic validators confirm them: 500+ XSS bugs, near-zero false positives.
Where the market is still unsettled
The agent-control market is forming quickly. Rig Security raised a $12M seed with CrowdStrike's Falcon Fund in the round, and Beltic raised about $8.8M for agent verification (Fortune's Term Sheet). Nvidia launched an Open Agent Safety Platform, though analysts quoted by CSO say most agent-caused problems fall outside its scope. Buy observability, and build the record of what the agent did inside the product yourself.
Two questions stay open. SB 947's "primarily relies" threshold is undefined, so expect enterprise customers to ask for a definition in security questionnaires and renewal redlines. The effective date isn't in any of the coverage; ask counsel before committing sprint dates.
What to do
Spec a single decision-record object this sprint, covering inputs, model version, AI contribution weight, reviewer, override, notice and outcome, and assign one platform owner so teams don't build three versions
Score every agent action on your roadmap against the NCSC's five dimensions this sprint, and assign each to auto-execute, confirm or suggest-only, with nothing irreversible on auto
Email your OpenAI and Anthropic account contacts this week asking for their planned usage-policy changes tied to the FTC probe, and log the answers in your risk register